Our Mission
SecDev iscommitted to academic excellence and operational relevance. We strive for improvements in policy and practice to effect efficient, ethical and real time change.
--The SecDev Group
complexity.engaged



SecDev iscommitted to academic excellence and operational relevance. We strive for improvements in policy and practice to effect efficient, ethical and real time change.
--The SecDev Group
complexity.engaged
A selection of recent reports
In order to address these new media challenges, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), Center for Strategic Leadership in partnership with the SecDev Group hosted a workshop entitled "Bullets and Blogs: New Media and the Warfighter." This workshop brought together leading practitioners from the Department of Defense, Department of State, Intelligence Community, and experts from academia.
This report is a synthesis of workshop discussions in terms of key takeaways addressing what is required to "win" in today's operational environment, where cyberspace and new media capabilities are significant components of the battlespace. .
by SecDev principals Deirdre Collings and Rafal Rohozinski can be purchased from the OECD Bookstore .
Synopsis
On average, 740 000 people die as a result of armed violence each year. This publication will help the international community to understand the dynamics of armed violence and outlines what can be done to reduce it.
Armed Violence Reduction identifies a number of significant emerging trends.Firstly, conflict and crime are increasingly linked. Secondly, levels of armed violence are a severe challenge in many non-conflict countries. Thirdly, increasing youth populations in the global South and the emergence of ungoverned urban spaces and youth gangs are a growing reality in many parts of the world. Alongside this, there are increasing links between local, national, regional and global security issues, for example through the trafficking of drugs, arms or people.
Armed Violence Reduction presents a number of well-researched avenues that can help respond to the above challenges and ultimately help enable development.
To order a copy of this publication, please contact Malika.Taberkane@oecd.org.
A report from the Information Warfare Monitor, a joint project of the Citizen lab, Munk Centre for International Studies, and the SecDev Group. The report can be downloaded from here .
Synopsis
This report documents the GhostNet - a suspected cyber espionage network of over 1,295 infected computers in 103 countries, 30% of which are high-value targets, including ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news media, and NGOs.
The capabilities of GhostNet are far-reaching. The report reveals that Tibetan computer systems were compromised giving attackers access to potentially sensitive information, including documents from the private office of the Dalai Lama. The report presents evidence showing that numerous computer systems were compromised in ways that circumstantially point to China as the culprit. But the report is careful not to draw conclusions about the exact motivation or the identity of the attacker(s), or how to accurately characterize this network of infections as a whole. The report argues that attribution can be obscured.
The report concludes that who is in control of GhostNet is less important than the opportunity for generating strategic intelligence that it represents. The report underscores the growing capabilities of computer network exploitation, the ease by which cyberspace can be used as a vector for new do-it-yourself form of signals intelligence. It ends with warning to policy makers that information security requires serious attention.
by Nart Villeneuve, Cheif Research Officer, Secdev.cyber. The report can be downloaded from here .
Synopsis
The report reveals troubling security and privacy breaches affecting TOM-Skype—the Chinese version of the popular voice and text chat software Skype, marketed by the domestic Chinese company TOM Online. TOM-Skype routinely collects, logs and captures millions of records that include personal information and contact details for any text chat and/or voice calls placed to TOM-Skype users, including those from the Skype platform.
These findings raise key questions. To what extent do TOM Online and Skype cooperate with the Chinese government in monitoring the communications of activists and dissidents as well as ordinary citizens? On what legal basis is TOM-Skype capturing and logging this volume and detail of personal user data and communication, and who has access to it?